The great Ethiopian land-grab: feudalism, leninism, neo-liberalism ... plus ça change
René Lefort, 31 December 2011
Subjects:Equality Economics Democracy and government Ethiopia
Land in Ethiopia is being leased to agro-industry investors on very long terms and below market rates. The beneficiaries have good political connections. But then land has been the play-thing of centralising authoritarians throughout Ethiopia's recent history.
About the author
René Lefort has been writing about sub-saharan Africa since the 1970s and has reported on the region for Le Monde, Le Monde diplomatique, Libération, Le Nouvel Observateur.
He is the author of "Ethiopia. An heretical revolution?" (1982, Zed books).
His email is renelefort@wanadoo.fr
Ethiopia is the world champion of “land grabbing” – the practice of renting out vast expanses of farmland to local and, in particular, foreign investors. In 2011, 3.5 million hectares were allocated, while the projected figure for 2015 is 7 million hectares, an area twice the size of Belgium.[i] By way of comparison, 12 million hectares are farmed by the same number of smallholders, who make up four-fifths of the Ethiopian workforce. It is not hard, then, to imagine the anticipated leap forward in agricultural output, especially given that the productivity of these new mechanised farms should be much greater than that of traditional peasant farmers. As a first approximation, medium sized yields and export of just half of their production should, in the medium term, bring in about US$ 10 billion in foreign currencies, at a time when the deficit in the balance of payments is the Achilles heel of the Ethiopian economy and its GDP currently stands at US$ 30 billion.
“They gave the land to us and we took it… This is green gold!” exclaimed one of the largest investors.[ii] The rents are “ridiculously low by any standard” (theoretically starting at US$ 8 dollars per hectare per year), the leases are for up to 99 years, finance facilities and tax breaks are increasingly generous as the share of exported produce goes up. Some are calling it “the deal of the century”.[iii] The authorities, who are solely responsible for this operation, because land is public property, [iv] challenge the term “land grabbing” and retort that these are “win win arrangements.” They say that only “abandoned” or “unutilized” land is open to the investors “on the basis of clearly set out lease arrangements… to make sure everybody will benefit from this exercise.”[v]
But the indictment of journalists and researchers, who have only recently been able to peek beneath the of this operation shrouded in secrecy, seems irrefutable.
“The government of one of the most vulnerable countries in the world is handing over vast land and water resources to foreign investors to help the food security efforts of their home countries, or to gain profits for their companies, without making adequate safeguards and without taking into account the food security needs of its own people.” The mechanism that they set up can be summarised as follows: Ethiopia rents out land to investors so that they can export their produce, and then import the same produce, grown somewhere else, to feed its own people. In the end, “the damage done… outweighs the benefits gained.”
The Ethiopian regime is anything but impulsive. It has obviously weighed up the pros and cons of land grabbing, especially since, for the large part, these were known in beforehand.[vi] So why did they throw themselves headlong into it?
The rush of investors for farmland is a global phenomenon, on a scale never seen before.[vii] But why has Ethiopia responded to this demand with such a staggering offer? There are two main factors – the influence of Ethiopia’s long heritage and the radical change of direction taken by the new “post revolutionary” ruling class over the past decade.[viii]
“Land was the sign, the source, the stake, the object of wealth and power; conversely, wealth and power gave access to the land [ix]" Haile Selassie, officially the sole and unique landowner, gave land to those whose support he wanted or to reward services rendered. They derived most of their income from a “feudal” exploitation of this land, on condition that they also handed over a substantial portion to the Crown. The Kings of Kings used this deduction as his economic weapon to attain the supreme goal of centralising power, at the expense of local “feudal” lords.
This mode of feudal extrication was even more brutal in areas on the edge of the Abyssinian plateau that had been conquered and subjugated at the end of the 19th century. The State handed out two thirds of these lands to its supporters, with outrageous favouritism shown to the Amharas of Shoa, which was the epicentre of imperial power. This particular form of what researchers have dubbed “internal colonialism”, which included settlers from the plateau, was justified either on racial grounds – the light-skinned “Northerners” from the plateau, versus the “black” people, the chankilla (slaves) of the South –or on social grounds – the “Northern” farmers versus the agro-pastoralists or pastoralists of the South– and on the basis of a myth, whereby these vast lands were an almost deserted Eldorado, a natural outlet for the insatiable hunger for land arising from the extreme density of the Abyssinian plateau. All of this also fuelled a spontaneous emigration of “Northerners”.
For the imperial regime, agriculture was the engine for development. But as the regime came to an end, it oscillated between two strategies. For the first, which remained marginal, “small farmers are efficient and are capable of being the engine of growth and economic development” on condition that they receive help to increase their remarkably low productivity. Whence the timid appearance from the 1960s onwards of “package programmes.[x] In the second strategy, which dominated and received the support of international organisations, these “subsistence farmers” are incapable of “productivity growth”. Salvation could only come from the development of “large and mechanized farm enterprises.” Hence the emergence of “agrarian capitalism” or “mechanised feudalism[xi] through land concessions given to private Ethiopian, and sometimes foreign, investors. This was ultimately the case for about 2% of cultivated land.
When the Derg took power in 1974, with its Marxist-Leninist ideology backed by the student movement, its priorities was to eradicate this “feudal” class of “landlords” by one of the most radical agricultural reforms ever undertaken: “land to the tiller.”[xii] It became public property. But the State maintained a sort of crown right over its administration, beginning with granting use rights to peasants over a parcel of land roughly proportional to the size of their family.
In a break with the imperial regime, its economic strategy was aimed first at the mass of smallholders. It made widespread use of the ‘packages’. But it very quickly adopted the “socialist” dogma of agricultural development with the emphasis on large mechanised farms. Once nationalised, the large private farms became rather like sovkhozes, and failed in much the same way. Migration from the plateau to the lowlands increased dramatically through forced “resettlement” drives. When the current regime came to power in 1991, it did not touch the 1974 agrarian reform. The thread running through history remained unbroken – land rights continued “to define relations of power between the state… and smallholders and their communities.”[xiii] But unlike its predecessors, the current regime put subsistence farmers at the centre not only of agricultural development but development in general, with a level of public support unequalled in Africa and probably in the world. The aim was to lift the peasant masses out of their abyssal poverty, to achieve nationwide food security, and to stimulate the foundations of an industry encouraged by the demand for basic commodities by the fringe of the newly “rich” peasants. Ten years on, the failure of this strategy has become patent, not for want of public funding, but mainly because the authorities applied it using the same top-down approach as its predecessors. The authoritarian recruitment of small farmers deprived the strategy of a key element – their empowerment. In fact, the authorities refused to let this happen. As the evidently “enlightened” avant-garde, they alone could decide what the peasants had to do and to impose this on them. And this empowerment could above all have undermined their hegemony. Agricultural productivity languished (and is still at a standstill). Food security stayed (and remains) a mirage. Emergency food aid and, since 2005, a vast programme of cash for work and food for work programmes (the Productive Safety Net Programme) continue to be needed for one out of six Ethiopians, on average. Industry stagnated too.
This economic failure was coupled with a major political setback. The regime was convinced that its efforts to help the peasant masses would guarantee their unswerving support. It was confident that there would be no risk in opening the political arena more than ever for the 2005 elections, in order to gain national and international legitimacy. But the rise of the opposition shook the regime. The millions of small farmers mostly followed the rural elite, spearhead of the opposition movement.[xiv]
In the early 2000s the convergence of these two factors and the elimination of the ruling party’s “left wing” after its worst internal crisis led to a Copernican revolution, dubbed “Renewal”. It had two inextricably intertwined strands. Since 1991, development had primarily been “indigenous” - or introverted. It needed to mobilise the relatively homogeneous mass of small farmers as a whole, with the aid of massive but undifferentiated state support. Development was to become primarily “exogenous” – or extravert. Following a “structural change”, Ethiopia now had to follow a new dogma – to become part of “the mainstream of the global market economy”. What is at stake? Nothing less than “to ensure national survival as a country.”[xv] But becoming part of this mainstream now requires expansion of the tiniest and most capitalist sectors, led by the “new entrepreneurs”. To this end they are being promised the (much-demanded) freedom to do business and an almost complete monopoly on public support – in other words, the fast track to becoming rich. In political terms the ruling power expects, in return, that they will guarantee their support, using their position as opinion leaders for the peasant masses and even the urban population – i.e. that these new entrepreneurs become the regime’s new constituency.
This explains the appearance of the “model farmers” within traditional agriculture. They are chosen on the basis of their ability to grow “marketable farm products”. They attract the bulk of State agricultural support and are automatically – and if necessary forcefully - enrolled as members of the ruling party. Rural society is becoming socially and economically polarised. At the top is the emergence of a slender class of “kulaks”, while the mass of small farmers is left to fend for itself. “Those who take advantage will prosper, and the rest will lose mercilessly”.[xvi]
But “the key actor in this agricultural development will be relatively large-scale private investors.” The regime is returning to the old philosophy, whereby “the growth of large and mechanized farm enterprises” is the engine for growth in the agricultural sector. Once again, the “tractor ideology”, with its endless fields, farmed by an armada of machines, is definitely the only prospect for the future.
Ethiopia was unable to reach its goal of rapidly increasing its share of global commerce by relying solely on its traditional exports (coffee, oil seeds, etc.) from small producers. It hopes to use its very low labour costs to become an exporter of basic manufactured goods, but this will take time and success is by no means certain. The ruling power had no choice but to seize the golden opportunity presented by this global “land rush”. A combination of factors – the dogma of Ethiopia entering “into the mainstream of the global market economy,” the decision that “the agriculture sector will continue to be the engine of growth” and that it could only be fuelled by “relatively large-scale private investors,” the observation that Ethiopia is unable to raise the investments needed on its own –led unavoidably to its only immediately available asset of any value, its land, being put on the market, and to offer it to the only economic forces able to exploit it quickly: foreign investors. From the Ethiopian government’s perspective on the economy, land grabbing is far from being a foolish whim or a bit-part player. It has the starring role.
But there also has to be a healthy supply of investors. Given the competition in Africa, the Ethiopian authorities need to align themselves with the prevailing conditions and accept that they cannot control the process, at least in the short term[xvii] Nothing must get in the way of this unbridled “Go West” spirit.
This economic logic fits completely with the prevailing political logic. The radical Marxist “revolutionary elite” made a complete U-turn when it came to power in 1991, promising democratisation and a free market economy. In fact, using the same mechanisms of “communist engineering” based on “democratic centralism” that had been so useful for sizing power, this elite continued to consolidate their control to the point of achieving a monopoly. Today, due to ‘the effective “fusion” of party and state’,[xviii] Ethiopia is de facto ruled by a ‘monolithic party-state,’[xiv] dominated by a handful of leaders where Tigreans – 6% of the population – are over-represented.
This achievement of political monopoly cannot be divorced from what the researcher Jean François Bayart calls a “Thermidorian situation”,[xx] characterised by the “revolution of interests”. The new “revolutionary elite… is turning into a dominant class via the primitive accumulation of capital that comes with holding power, according to the classical procedure of straddling institutional, family and business interests.” It uses this political hegemony “to accumulate wealth or the means of production under the cover of “free trade”” and “joining the global market.”[xxi]
The first phase of this metamorphosis started as soon as the new government took office. The promised liberalisation of the economy led to a wave of privatisation but it was modest in reality. It left out the main public asset, land, as well as the banks, insurance companies, telecommunications and electricity utilities. The rest was just an illusion. “Privatisation became monopolisation.”[xxii]Through endowments supposedly created to stimulate rehabilitation, mainly of the Tigray State, the leadership plundered the “privatised” enterprises. Operating with a total lack of transparency, and enjoying a great many privileges, “State-owned enterprises and ruling party-owned entities dominate the major sectors of the economy.”[xxiii] Their profits “are not being rolled over… but diverted elsewhere.”[xxiv] Most of what was left over has been pocketed by a few oligarchs under the protection of top leaders of the party State. Lower down the scale, it is essential for any private entrepreneur to be able to count on the support of a powerful official to run his business. For a long time, the land – especially rural but also urban – and as a result agriculture, was left out of this grabbing process, remaining effectively public property. But an – unfortunately very poorly documented – process of “rampant privatisation” started at the end of the 1990s, mainly in urban areas. The first to benefit were senior officers during the war with Eritrea (1998-2000), who were rewarded with land that they then built on, mainly as a means of speculation. This privilege gradually extended to high-ups in the nomenklatura, then to those lower down. There is a return to a major feature of the pre-revolutionary period. Those in power started to reward their most devoted servants with land. And, inversely, owning land became the main gateway to wealth. For anyone visiting Addis Ababa, the construction boom will be the first thing that strikes them. Mutatis mutandis, the same process has percolated into the rural areas. Its most glaring manifestation is the recent eruption of floriculture, mainly run by foreign companies. But the amount of land involved is still small, about 1 600 hectares. In contrast, land grabbing started as early as 1996 with a total lack of transparency, but almost exclusively for the benefit of Ethiopian nationals, at least up until the mid-2000s. The first regions to be targeted were the irrigated lands of the Awash, Afar, bordering the Tigray region, and Kaffa, the main coffee-producing region. Even today, 95% of the investors are Ethiopians. Their farms are generally much smaller, a few hundred hectares at most. For want of skills and resources, fewer than 20% of these farms would have started to be developed. Essentially, then, these Ethiopians have made an investment, with what they themselves called “easy” access to loans and facilities for acquiring the land, if they had not been given it “for free.” This “preferential treatment” applied especially to Tigreans.[xxv]Once again, the central authorities used the allocation, and even gifts, of rural land to reward or consolidate what they considered to be their most loyal supporters, again with an ethnic bias. Once again, the age-old push toward the lowlands resumed, still presented as a deserted Eldorado.
“Land leases are tantamount to near ownership”, declared one of the largest foreign investors.[xxvi] With land grabbing, this process of land privatisation took on a new dimension. “What is being grabbed or transferred are rights belonging to individuals and communities”. Who is doing the grabbing? “The dominant classes, especially landed groups, capitalists, corporate entities, state bureaucrats and village chiefs… at the expense of citizens and grassroots communities.”[xxvii] And at the top of the list, in Ethiopia, the nucleus of the party State. It seized the monopoly on land grabbing for any land over 5 000 hectares. Previously, any real estate transaction, no matter what the size of the land, was handled by each of the nine States in the federation. It is this nucleus that laid its hands on the land rights by disappropriating the local communities, and then according itself the right – and the power that goes with it – to reallocate them to investors, all at its total discretion. Moreover, so long as the land was farmed by locals, there was hardly any surplus and this tended to remain within small local commercial and financial circuits. With land grabbing, output worth billions of dollars entered commercial and above all financial circuits controlled by the central power.
So, after industry and services, a new wave of centralisation of economic resources has been added to the already extreme centralisation of political power. They offer each other mutual support. Once again, land is playing a major role in rejuvenating the superimposition of wealth and power, public and private elites. A “revolutionary” interlude is coming to an end. And this has at least two major consequences.
Land grabbing is leading to the ““South Africanisation (of the agricultural structures)… meaning structures dominated by large, settler-type estates existing side by side with a host of impoverished small farms struggling to survive in the shadow of these estates.”[xxviii] It “marginalises” the rural population. It reinforces the “disempowerment” of traditional peasants, when the opposite is needed for them to become an “active agent in all matters affecting their lives.” In this way it is shattering the relative egalitarianism of the rural world that has been in place since 1974, by polarising society, and nurturing class division, another aspect of which is the ongoing “kulakisation” of the small farmers.
The present regime has instituted a federal system. It considers that the hypercentralisation, even Jacobinism of its predecessors had exacerbated the centrifugal forces, mainly ethnically driven, to the point of threatening the unity of Ethiopia. The perpetuation of this unity requires a genuine balance of power between all of the “nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia”. But land grabbing is part of a process of re-concentration, which renders the federal system even more artificial.
The issues involved in land grabbing go beyond the economy. On top of the tensions born of the government’s rejection of all forms of democratisation, on top of the mounting ethnic tensions, it helps to sharpen the divide between the classes. It is going to turn the entire political landscape upside down, deepening the divisions within Ethiopian society.
[i] Dessalegn Rahmato, 2011, Land to Investors: Large-Scale Land Transfers in Ethiopia, Forum for Social Studies, Addis Ababa. The other reference study is The Oakland Institute 2011, Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa – Country Report Ethiopia. Unless otherwise stated, all the following quotations are taken from these documents.
[ii] In Zenawi says: No land grab in Ethiopia, not today, not tomorrow, Keffyalew Gebremedhin, 9 August 2011.
[iii]Ethiopia at centre of global farmland rush, The Guardian, 21 March 2011.
[iv] The Constitution stipulates that “Land (rural as urban) is a common property of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to other means of exchange… Ethiopian peasants have right to obtain… the protection against eviction from their possession”.
[v] Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, ITMN Television, 26 June 2011.
[vi] In an interview for the Financial Times (7 August 2008), Meles Zenawi himself predicted that “large-scale farming” could bring “some employment”, but “not much”. It would not solve the problem of food insecurity because “it is not about production, it’s about income distribution… (which) is not going to be improved by concentrating on large farms.”
[vii] These figures give a range from 50 to 80 million hectares rented globally to to foreign investors in the past few years, mainly in Africa.
[viii] The last emperor, Haile Selassie, was overthrown by a socialist military junta, the Derg, in 1974. This in turn was overthrown in 1991 by a coalition of armed movements, led by a radically Marxist regional autonomist movement, the Trigray People’s Liberation Front. It remains the cornerstone of the ethnic coalition currently in power.
[ix] Ethiopia – An Heretical Revolution, René Lefort, 1983, Zed Press
[x] Fertilizer and selected seeds plus loans plus training.
[xi] Lefort, 1983.
[xii] Land reform of 4 March1974.
[xiii] The peasant and the State – Studies in Agrarian Changes in Ethiopia 1950s-2000s, Dessalegn Rahmato, 2009, Addis Ababa University Press.
[xiv] Powers – mengist - and peasants in rural Ethiopia: the May 2005 elections, Lefort René, Journal of Modern African Studies, 45/2, 2007.
[xv] Meles Zenawi, African Development: Dead Ends And New Beginnings, 9 August 2006. This quotation, as well as those that follow, are taken from this document and The EPRDF's Rural Development Vision : An Overview, Special Issue N°3 of Renewal (Tehadso), April 2002; Development, democracy and revolutionary democracy, August 2006 (internal document of the EPRDF).
[xvi] Development, democracy and revolutionary democracy, internal document of the ruling party, August 2006.
[xvii] Or to take over later, when the balance of power is more favourable, because investors have to wait at least until the sizeable investments needed to kick-start their farms have started to pay off: “Prime Minister Meles and the Government of Ethiopia have historically proven to be crafty negotiators… Therefore, it is reasonable to assume the GoE … has a reasonable overall plan” to renegotiate the contracts later (Ethiopia seeks dramatic changes in agricultural land use, 10 December 2009, Wikileaks).
[xviii] Aalen L. & Tronvoll K. 2009. The End of Democracy? Curtailing political and civil rights in Ethiopia, Review of African Political Economy, 36/4.
[xix] Clapham C. 2009. Post-War Ethiopia: The Trajectories of Crisis, Review of African Political Economy, 36, 120.
[xx] In reference to the Thermidorian reaction (1794) which ended the Terror era of the French revolution
[xxi] Jean François Bayart, Le concept de situation thermidorienne : régimes néo-révolutionnaires et libéralisation économique, Questions de Recherche/Research in Question N°24 – March2008, Centre d’études et de recherches internationales, Ecole des sciences politiques, Paris.
[xxii] Idem.
[xxiii] Idem.
[xxiv] Party-statals : How the ruling parties “endowments” operate, 19 March 2009, Wikileaks.
[xxv] Oakland Institute.
[xxvi] Idem
[xxvii] Dessalegn Rahmato.
[xxviii] Ruth Hall, The Many Faces of the Investor Rush in Southern Africa: Towards a Typology of Commercial Land Deals, 2010, unpublished paper, cited by Dessalegn Rahmato.
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Goobeenna
What scares me is not only what TPLF is doing but also what the opposition is also doing. In Ethiopian politics today, there is a stalemate created by political popularization. If it continues this way, I don't see how the country will avoid a long and protracted civil war that will be very messy.
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01/01/2012 07:42 PM
Bereket
Unlike your fake analysis, The reality is thanks to the EPRDF, Ethiopia was pulled back from the abyss and without further ado commenced work on the stability and construction of the country. In less than twenty years, Ethiopia has been transformed beyond recognition and its people are reaping the benefits.
Private and government initiated constructions are booming in every part of the country. The need for cement is extremely high; as the existing factories could not cope with the demand, thousands of tons of additional cements are being imported regularly. In Addis Ababa alone, 71,000 condominiums have been constructed for the low paid resulting in the creation of 300,000 jobs. Thirty-one new universities have come into existence and the undergraduate in take is expected to go up from 185,788 to 467,000 in the life of the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). New primary and secondary schools are springing up in every corner of the country. Enrolment for grade 1 to 8 will reach 100%, and for secondary schools 75% by 2014/2015. Adult literacy rate presently stands at 36% and is forecasted to increase to 95% in about four years time.
Food production has shown a staggering increase over the years. In Tigray alone, in 2005, total crop production was 7 million quintals and in 2010 this jumped to 35 million. The number of people seeking food assistance in Ethiopia now stands at few millions and famine has become a thing of the past. Farmers are getting good money for their produce and this has become an incentive for them to produce more. From their small muddy huts in remote areas, they follow prices thanks to their mobiles and sell their crops at the appropriate time. At this juncture, there are 10 million mobile users country wise, and this expected to rise to 64.4 million in 2014. Primary Health Coverage in every part of the country is envisaged to reach 100% in a couple of year’s time. And this will ensure good health for the food producers and their families who are the backbones of the economy. Water borne diseases will be eliminated as coverage of clean potable water would go up from the current 68.5% to 98.5% by 2014/2015.
To enable the swift movements of industrial and agricultural goods, huge new road construction and upgrading is under way. So far, 49,000 Kilometers have been completed and by 2014 this expected to go up to 136,000. The road transport will be complemented by the construction of 5000 km railway network that will connect various parts of the country with each other and with the ports of Djibouti, Kenya and Berbera. Hopefully this would be extended to Assab and Massaw once the Eritrean dictator is removed from the scene. The project is expected to cost $336 million a year for five years and is estimated to create 300,000 jobs.
Ethiopia can see light at the end of the tunnel. The light will even get brighter when the Grand Dam (4.8 billion Euros) capable of generating over 5000 mega watts becomes operational in a few years time. By the end of 2014, the country would be in a position to generate 8000 mega watts for domestic consumption and export to neighbouring countries. Since this government came into office, numerous dams such us Gilgle Gibe 1( $331 million),Tekeze( $365 million), Tana Beles($500 million ),Gilgel Gibe 2( 370 million Euros), Gilgel Gibe 3(1.55 billion Euros),Fincha Amerti Nesse( $276 million), Halele Worabese( 470 million Euros),Gilgel Gibe 4($ 1.9 billion), Chemoga Yeda($ 555 million), and Genale Dawa 3( $ 408 million) are completed and providing service and some are under construction. With some of these dams already generating energy, the demand for electricity is still astronomical and this is a clear evidence of economic growth and prosperity in the country. More requests for energy would come from the ten sugar factories under construction that would make Ethiopia the 10th largest sugar exporter in the world. A lot more work is needed, and there would be no rest until Ethiopia is on par with middle income countries.
Stability is essential if the momentum of the fast economic growth is to be maintained. The EPRDF has got to search itself from time to time as it did recently to avoid stagnation. Leaders should be brave enough to bring new people with fresh ideas and vision to the forefront. Ethiopia is lucky enough to be blessed with a visionary leader like Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Under his stewardship, the country has travelled significantly and the ground has been laid down for this to continue uninterrupted with a new leader at the helm.
Changes within the sister organizations of the EPRDF are encouraging but the same can’t be said about the doyne of them all, the TPLF. The same people are being shuffled from one post into another and we have had the same leader for over three decades. The TPLF has become solely dependent on PM Meles and it alarming to notice no obvious successor is visible from what is left of the TPLF. It is imperative a major overhaul of the front is carried out as matter of utmost urgency. Fifty thousand people gave their lives for the TPLF and the TPLF is not for today, tomorrow but forever. Let new people come into the horizon and face the challenges ahead with new vigor and determination. It is high time to hand over power to the new generation and only in this way, would the TPLF prosper and go from strength to strength. Failure to do so could eventually lead to its demise and those responsible would be held accountable by the Tigrian people. The enemies of Tigray should not have the last
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01/01/2012 08:27 PM 1 Like
monen
Hey is this comment about Ethiopia or Etviopia? I really want to emigrate to this country so please notify me its wherabout....
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01/02/2012 11:34 AM in reply to Bereket
Adv Trek
It's only a "concern" when White people don't get piece of pie in Africa, China & India beating them to deals nowadays...Colonialism by arms no longer option, eh?
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01/01/2012 10:53 PM 1 Like
BC
The people oppressing Africans are not exclusively white. By creating a dichotomy of Black versus White you are creating a situation where unscrupulous African dictators can oppress other Africans as part of that fight.
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01/02/2012 12:36 PM in reply to Adv Trek
Truth
If the "land grabbing" were done by Europeans we would have heard different stories. The West would have told us they are saving us from starvation. What hypocrisy!
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01/01/2012 11:36 PM 2 Likes
Kapron2001
We must have been doing something right and good for ourselves that makes some white Europeans cry foul like the writer in the above article. When we got things wrong they feel sorry for us, but then when we get things right, they try to tell us how to walk and do our business.
The above writer should have investigated why the so called Europeans Union is in economical mess rather than worry about Africans. The fact that China and India are hand and gloves with Africans in getting rid of poverty scares some Europeans to death like the writer in the above article.
The days when Europeans treating Africans like a child has gone and will never come back. And I thought the writer should have known better before trying to scare us like his grand fathers used to do in the 18th century.
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01/02/2012 01:43 AM 2 Likes
Kidane
To
all ignorant and arrogant TPLF’s cadres, there is a very good answer for you
stupid and opportunistic comments. Please read it below. If you want read the
whole comment on thw following website.
http://www.ethiopianreview.com...
“Dr.
Aklog reminds TPLF/EPRDF leaders and their supporters that “development is all
about people” after all. And by stating that, “The regime expropriates and
gives farmlands away to the highest bidder without any open competition. The
reason is simple. It is to ensure single party dominance over the national
economy…”, ” that these permanent transfers of one of the pillars of the
economy to a privileged few domestic investors (Mainly Tigrians) and to
governments, firms and individuals from 36 countries contradict the governing
party’s commitment to the Ethiopian people that land is a common property that
is bound by specific norms, values and constitutional parameters..”, further
exposes their deceitful practices and hallow arguments. He reminds the regime
and its supporters that, as has been proven in the late Sixties and early
Seventies, Ethiopian domestic investors are capable of transforming fertile
farmlands into mechanized and large scale commercial farms if they are given
the opportunity and have the freedom.”
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01/02/2012 01:46 AM
Ethiochangenow
Those who engaged in ad hominem attack on Rene did not or could not dispute his analysis based on factual evidence. All their comments were based on irrelevant facts that had nothing to do with his analysis. These people are either intellectually disabled or dishonest. But facts are stubborn things. They don't change however loud you scream to change your colors.
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01/02/2012 05:45 AM 2 Likes
AB
Gifti,
Would like to say Thanks to Monsieur/ Professor Rene Lefort for brilliant analysis of Ethiopia's present political economy. Ignore the imbeciles from Aiga Forum with their fake nationalist pretense. Their seemingly coordinated attack on your article was the result of their cadre mentality. The way the tribalist government or its cadre supporters deal with opposing views is to attack the person but not providing substantive facts and valid arguments.
This kind of close scrutiny was what is needed than those mythical development figures this tribal government spew or propagate and taken as facts by local "development" journalists and by lazy foreign reporters. Your article has laid bare the fact that this tribal government's policy has failed, is suffering from high deficit and who gets preferential access to resources such as land/financing or who dominates the economic landscape and what type of leaders the country is under in. Once again, Merci beaucoup and please continue speaking the truth whether those in power like it or not and let the world know the reality.
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01/02/2012 07:09 AM 1 Like
Cunningtplf
as i read all comments against Rene's analysis, it was not difficult to guess that all comments are written by one individual. the ideas are the same.
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01/02/2012 07:28 AM
BC
You are quite right. There are 10 of them with the same IP address! I've reported this to the moderators.
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01/02/2012 02:56 PM in reply to Cunningtplf
Kebede
Excellent analysis, well researched and fact both about the
pre 1974 land and power and current TPLF subtle ways of controlling the means
of production to stay in power, are accurate. It would have been wonderful if you have shared your thought on urban land
as well.
We all know the solution to eradicate poverty, is to give back ownership of land to the peasant. Ownership not Lessing this superficial ownership the
farmer has a right to farm, causing further fragmentation and lowering
productivity of scale. TPLF know if they give land to the people they don’t
power to control. Therefore, no matter the propaganda they played about Renaissance
, Transformation, Development State. At
end they are not committed to the development of Ethiopia or the eradication of
poverty. In one hand they know they can’t continue feeding the people of
Ethiopia with Aid on the other if they return land to it legitimate owner the
tenant they know they don’t have cloth to push around any one, or the means to
stay in power. They is why the came up with the new law of the urban land ownership.
Deprive the people from their empowerment and give and take wealth as they
please. Figures tells us the productive of land has not even reached were it
was in 1961. All the economic
development is an elusion of the TPLF nothing more
Like Reply
01/02/2012 06:15 PM
Girma2
what an excellent and insightful observation!
Like Reply
01/03/2012 09:24 AM
Gemech
I read René
Lefort’s article with interest. Although the history of Ethiopia
is not new to me or to Ethiopians in general, it is nonetheless, interesting to
see it written from a westerner’s point of view, a view that says, “My system
is better, I know better for you”, kind of thing. Judging from the tone and
content of the article it is easy to see it is written partly, for the
consumption of the Ethiopians in diaspora. The reason why I say this is his
comments about who is who in government and who is benefiting from which government
policy, singling out the people of Tigray as the single most beneficiary, looks like he took such words right out of the
mouths of the Ethiopian government opposition
groups in the diaspora, who are week in and week out clamouring for “Arab
Spring” type of uprising to take place
in Ethiopia in the hope that they may retake
the power they lost when the dust settles. And partly, of course, for the
benefit of European readers who obviously don’t like Asian
investment financing development in Ethiopia and in Africa in general.
Today what we need is not a European to tell us
what our past and our current situation is, as we are very well aware of them. At
present what we need is not negative condemnation for attempting this or that strategy in our endeavours to eradicate poverty but technical support, suggesting tried and
tested means of erasing the world’s consciousness
of Ethiopia as the country of famine stricken people. That is the very reason why our peoples, with
the EPRDF, are striving hard to increase the agricultural production in order
to aid in the elimination of famine and kick start industrial development. If
this can be achieved by leasing hitherto unutilised land to foreigners, so be
it.
About the prospects of the land lease, the author
already concluded the outcome by saying, “the damage
done… outweighs the benefits gained.” I say it is
too immature to reach such a conclusion as the process has only just begun. What
I always ask myself after reading such , seemingly expert assessment of
Ethiopia’s experiment with democracy or different development strategies is, what’s wrong with Ethiopia trying to bring
large tracts of land under cultivation?. What’s wrong in leasing such land to
foreigners with the capital and the know how to help with increase productivity
and foreign exchange earnings? What’s
wrong in Ethiopia trying to expand its export earnings instead of depending on coffee or pulses alone?
Above all, what is wrong in
trying to reduce the number of people depending on subsistence farming and lead
them to alternative employment in the service sector or in industry?
He also said, “The regime was
convinced that its efforts to help the peasant masses would guarantee their
unswerving support.” My question to is, is Ethiopia the only country that tries
to impress its voters by promising or by actually doing something beneficial to
the public or a targeted group? Why is the accumulation of capital and the
creation of a middle class so bad when it comes to Ethiopia? Isn’t this a prerequisite for future involvement
of the local entrepreneur in agriculture and industry? I thought that was how other countries came
out of backwardness in these areas.
He tried
to portray Ethiopia as a country divided by colour. This is absolutely wrong as
we are all black people. In his attempt
to paint the government as playing with colour differences of the people, he
said the northerners are “light-skinned”
and the southerners are “black” people, the chankilla (slaves). Really? Was Menelik from the south? As he said it himself,
he was the one who subjugated the south in the “internal colonisation” of the
19th century. I can’t insult him
by suggesting that the country is ethnically and linguistically diverse. However,
I must
emphasise the fact that the “black and light –skinned” people he
mentioned are spread all over the country. In fact it is normal for siblings to
have different shades of colour regardless of the colour of their parents. “Yenat
hod Zingurgur” yibal yele? Colour has never been a problem in Ethiopia. What
was the problem was the neglect of ethnic nations and nationalities by previous
systems of government. At present the current government is addressing this
issue through the federal democratic system,
All in all, this article is in line with the
current concerted campaign by aid agencies, human rights agencies and journalists
of all kinds for its choice of growth strategy that doesn’t satisfy Western
interests.
I
agree with Ethiopians who have legitimate concerns with the length of the lease
period or the rent price being too low or the displacement of farmers without
adequate compensation or alternative dwellings and employment. In this respect
while I think it is important that land has to be brought into production I urge
the EPRDF to negotiate hard to get the best value for the land and make sure
that land under cultivation by small holders is out of bounds to lease to foreigners..
Like Reply
01/03/2012 02:32 PM 1 Like
Abel
As Rene Lefort clearly pointed out, the TPLF's rush to join the global land grab is just one of its many attempts to garner capital. As usual whatever money they can raise the TPLF cleptocracy will steal most of it and dole out the rest to their henchmen that they have assigned to run the regions. Whatever they do is aimed at extending their oppression and the dectatorship they have imposed on the over 80 million Ethiopians. They will attempt to continue their human rights abuses, bad governance and corruption by using all possible means at their disposal. Controlling the land and stifling the growth of the economy are just part of the TPLF strategy to extend its shelf life, which is by the way long past its due date. And the TPLF gang of criminals can control the means of production so long as they manage to stay in power. They can not do that once the will of the people prevails and real democracy sweeps across the land that we call ETHIOPIA.
Like Reply
01/04/2012 05:44 AM
Bulla Tolla
If I were these foreign investors I will not invest a single penny trusting the current government. The government is using these investors as its last ditch survival strategy. They are hoping their countries will intervene and protect them when the people rise against them. Unless they have planned to occupy Ethiopia; it is not a wise investment to evict farmers and turn them to destitute in their own country. If they have the slightest intention of occupying a tiny piece of Ethiopia; those who currently even support Melese will turn their weapon against you. As to the farmers; if they get to their breaking point; they will just set fire and blaze up the farms and the equipments within a minute. That was what they did to feudal lords. I never forget the tractors, houses and crops farmers set ablaze during the revolution. Ethiopian farmers do not sit and let you take away their lively hood. All they need is a single spark like the one that took place in Tunisia. If I were those Indians; I will be weary of what they are doing. Ethiopians are proud people even when they are starved; they never sell their dignity. They never do stupid things just to feed themselves for a day or two. They prefer dying with their dignity intact. They know that death is inevitable. No amount of money will ever buy their dignity. Leave the opportunist around this government and talk the people like those in the above interview. Most of them are time bombs just waiting for the right time. They will never settle for backdoor colonialism.
Like Reply
01/04/2012 10:11 PM
Yohannes
It is so funny to read Mr.Berekets comment after a well-researched paper by Mr Rene Lefort.What are you trying to prove we are talking about land grabbing and you are commenting about other stuff.If you have any argument let us here it.Otherwise do not try to confuse things that is all you are about anyway.Land -grabbing is a serious issue.The Meles dictatorial government is not only selling it but giving it away almost free.As we all know there are a lot of Ethiopians who do not have land to farm.Just for a little support from the west to slave Ethiopians is inhuman and oppressive act.The most ridiculous of all this land- grabbing is Meles'es comment on it to the fake parliment( yes I can say fake in the proper sense of the word) is that at the rate we are going Ethiopians are going to be landless in their own country.This was said by the person who is benfitting from it and pocketing the money with his cronies the DICTATOR- IN -CHIEF MELES ZENAWI.What a joke.Ethiopianswill get their land whether anybdy likes or not.One ca not buy a stolen land make it legitment.If you have any valid argumebt let us here it Mr Bereket
Like Reply
01/05/2012 01:02 AM
Tulu
The title of the article and the analysis is disjointed. Over all Mr Lefort's attempt to expose the essence of the "revolutionary", "Marxist" TPLF as the vangurad or usurper of party state and the emergence of a predatory ethno-nationalist hegmonic/oligarchic class which seemed it cloned itself of the pre-revoutioanry (1974) Ethiopa is an addition to study of ethnic based state structure. The article shortcoming is the author's method of journalistic review to crump or single out only the economic aspect(land) from the political ( sovereign rights of the ruled) and expect different result..by simply decoupling the one from the other. Whether Mr Lefort dislike for the "radical" left which he was once the admirer of che and the student radicals of the '60s,clouded his crtical analysis ..calling TPLF a " Marxist" front becuase it called itself Marxist is similar western/US backers of the Meles regime " A new breed of African leaders". Once you start out your argument to fit into your version of world view not the objective reality of the Ethiopian situation and constant yearning of free people to gain their liberty, you seldom end up not mentioning or dismissing the agents of channge lurking underneath, the resilemcey of the Ethiopian peopel not as ethnic entiy or as you seldom inject the "North" " South" divide.
Though your writing is correct in most of your anaylysis about the ethno-fascist group whic call itself TPLF, you see Ethiopian as conglomration of tribes and ethnic groups which for ever stay mired as if the historical phonmena in relative terms is not unique to Ethiopia if it is its surlong survavila as Nation-state inspite of The Euopian colinial project.
Any way I thank you for your analysis..that might throw some light to your Western readers who has no any clue about the subject.
Like Reply
01/06/2012 08:34 AM
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